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AbstractNon-technical summary 
Credit derivatives such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS) have significantly simplified the trading of credit 
risk over the last few years. A standardised contract design, low transaction costs and a large and 
heterogeneous set of market participants have helped the CDS to hold the benchmark function for the 
price discovery process in the corporate debt market. Today the CDS is the most popular traded credit 
derivative.
We study the risk of holding credit default swaps (CDS) in the trading book. In particular, we compare 
the Value at Risk (VaR) of a CDS position to the VaR for investing in the respective firm’s equity. Our 
sample consists of CDS – stock price pairs for 86 actively traded firms over the period from March 
2003 to October 2006. We find that the VaR for a stock is usually far larger than the VaR for a position 
in the same firm’s CDS. However, the distance between CDS VaR and equity VaR is markedly smaller 
for firms with high credit risk. The distance also declines for longer holding periods. We also observe a 
positive correlation between CDS and equity VaR. Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Kreditderivate wie Credit Default Swaps (CDS) haben in den letzten Jahren den Handel mit 
Kreditrisiko signifikant vereinfacht. Ein standardisiertes Kontrakt-Design, niedrige Transaktionskosten 
und eine große and heterogene Gruppe von Marktteilnehmern haben dazu beigetragen, dass CDS die 
Benchmark - Funktion für die Preisbestimmung im Markt für Unternehmens-Verschuldung erreichen. 
Heute ist der CDS das am meisten gehandelte Kreditderivat. 
Wir analysieren das Risiko von CDS, die im Handelsbuch gehalten werden. Wir vergleichen den Value 
at Risk (VaR) der CDS Position mit dem VaR für eine Position in der Aktie der gleichen Firma. Unsere 
Stichprobe umfasst CDS – Aktien Paare für 86 aktiv gehandelte Firmen im Zeitraum von März 2003 
bis Oktober 2006. Wir finden, dass der VaR der Aktie meistens den VaR der CDS - Position deutlich 
übersteigt. Die Distanz zwischen dem CDS - VaR und dem Aktien - VaR ist jedoch bei Firmen mit 
hohem Kreditrisiko deutlich geringer. Die Distanz sinkt auch bei längeren Haltedauern. Wir 
beobachten weiter eine positive Korrelation zwischen dem CDS - VaR und dem Aktien - VaR. Introduction 
Credit derivatives such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS) have significantly simplified the trading 
of credit risk over the last few years
3. A standardised contract design, low transaction costs 
and a large and heterogeneous set of market participants have helped the CDS to hold the 
benchmark function for the price discovery process in the corporate debt market. Today the 
CDS is the most popular traded credit derivative. 
A CDS provides insurance against losses arising to creditors from a firm’s default and the 
CDS market quote is the cleanest available measure for the market price of corporate default 
risk. Historically, individual bond features such as seniority, coupon structure, embedded 
options and the fact that many investors follow a buy and hold strategy have contributed to 
the comparatively low liquidity in the corporate bond market. In contrast, the standardisation 
of CDS contracts has supported the development of an active market and therefore reduced 
the liquidity premia observed in corporate bond spreads.
4In addition, CDS data remove the 
need to specify a risk-free term structure in order to calculate credit spreads. Before the 
advent of a liquid credit risk transfer market, credit risky instruments such as loans or 
corporate bonds could not reliably be marked to market. Now, credit risky instruments can be 
actively traded, leading to a “convergence” of the formerly divided banking and trading books. 
In this paper we study the risk of holding a CDS in the trading book. Thus, we focus on the 
risk of CDS trading rather than on using a CDS to hedge credit risk. As we treat the credit 
risky investment as a pure tradable claim we apply a mark-to-market approach for its 
valuation. In particular, we compare the Value at Risk (VaR) of a CDS protection seller to the 
VaR for the same notional amount in the respective firm’s equity. Our sample consists of CDS 
– stock price pairs for 86 actively traded firms over the period from March 2003 to October 
2006. We measure CDS and equity VaR by means of historical simulation (HS) and study the 
time series behaviour of the two risk measures as well as their comovement.
5
The combined risk modelling of stock prices and credit spreads is specifically relevant for the 
recently popular trading strategy of capital structure arbitrage. This strategy relies on relative 
pricing differences between a firm’s debt and equity and is commonly used by hedge funds 
and banks’ proprietary traders. 
6
One of our main findings is that the VaR for a stock is typically far larger than the VaR for a 
position in the same firm’s CDS. However, the distance between the two VaRs shrinks for 
firms with higher credit risk and declines with increasing holding period. Moreover, both risk 
measures are significantly positively correlated. Based on a simple analysis of the Merton 
3 In this paper, default risk is defined as the exposure to losses arising from a borrower’s default, whereas credit risk 
also captures the losses arising from a borrower’s downgrading. 
4 Blanco et al. (2005) document that CDS premia lead bond spreads and are taking an increasingly important role in 
the price discovery process. 
5 Some of the recent papers on market pricing of CDS are Ericsson et al. (2005), Zhang et al. (2005), Acharya and 
Johnson (2007) or Huang and Zhou (2007). 
6 Yu (2006) offers an empirical analysis of the profitability of this trading strategy. 
1(1974) model we argue that our empirical results are in accordance with the structural 
modelling approach to default risk. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section I we describe the mechanism of credit 
default swaps, the sample and the VaR model. Section II contains our empirical analysis. In 
Section III we summarize our main results and provide some conclusions. 
I.  Sample and methodology 
A. The CDS market 
CDS transfer the risk that a certain individual entity defaults from the “protection buyer” to the 
“protection seller” in exchange for the payment of a premium. They are the most frequently 
traded credit derivative.
 7 Commonly, CDS have a maturity of one to ten years with most of 
the liquidity concentrated on the five year horizon. The details of a CDS transaction are 
recorded in the CDS contract, which is usually based on a standardised agreement prepared 
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), an association of major 
market participants. The contract defines all “credit events” where the protection seller needs 
to compensate the protection buyer. Typically five events are included
8:
•  the reference entity fails to meet payment obligations when they are due 
• Bankruptcy 
• Repudiation 
•  Material adverse restructuring of debt 
•  Acceleration or Default of Obligation 
In a CDS transaction, the premium, which the buyer of credit risk (i.e. the protection seller) 
receives is expressed as an annualised percentage of the notional value of the transaction 
and this value is recorded as the “market price” of the CDS in data bases such as Bloomberg. 
CDS have become the most commonly used credit derivative because they enable investors 
to synthetically trade pure credit risk. Using no-arbitrage arguments, Duffie (1999) shows that 
the CDS premium theoretically equals the spread over LIBOR on a par floating rate note. 
Hence, the risk – return structure of a CDS protection buyer resembles a trade where the 
investor buys a corporate bond and hedges the interest rate risk in order to isolate the credit 
risk component in the bond. 
If any of the events stipulated in the contract occurs, then the compensation will be 
transferred, either through cash settlement where the price difference between the current 
value and the nominal value of the reference asset is transferred or through physical 
7 See Fitch (2006) for a detailed survey of the credit derivatives market. 
8 Packer and Zhu (2005) discuss different contract specifications and their impact on observed CDS prices. 
2settlement where the bond specified in the CDS contract is delivered from the protection 
buyer to the seller. Most contracts specify physical settlement.  
The launch of harmonised CDS indices has been a major step in the evolution of the credit 
risk transfer market. In June 2004 a new family of indices was introduced, namely iTraxx in 
Europe and Asia and CDX in North America. This harmonisation has led to generally 
accepted benchmarks and therefore increased market transparency and market liquidity in 
the credit market.  
The composition of this index family provides the basis for our sample selection. The indices 
are calculated on a daily frequency and are divided into several subgroups, ranging from 
sector categories to a high-yield segment. In the investment grade corporate segment, the 
indices contain the equally weighted CDS premia of the 125 most liquid firms. Selection of 
index constituents is based on a semi-annual poll of the main CDS dealers, which then leads 
to an update of the index composition in March and September of each year.  
B. Sample construction 
The empirical analysis comprises individual European firms in the investment grade and high 
yield segment. Our sample covers financial firms as well as industrial firms and is designed to 
be representative across ratings and industry sectors. The starting point for the firm selection 
is the set of 125 investment grade corporates in the iTraxx Europe and the iTraxx Europe 
Crossover with the composition as of October 2005.
 9  In order to remove potential exchange 
rate effects we restrict our analysis to firms from the Euro area. 
To construct the hypothetical trading book positions we need a matched sample of CDS 
premia and stock prices. For this purpose, we remove all those firms where the equity ticker 
and the CDS ticker are not exactly equal. This filter is necessary because after take-overs, 
companies take over debt from the firms they acquired. If the ex-ante difference in issuers is 
neglected, then the date of the merger would be ignored. Next, we check the number of 
available observations for the CDS and stock prices in Bloomberg. We find satisfactory data 
coverage from March 2003 onwards; hence, our sample period is March, 1 2003 to October, 
11 2006.  
After this filter procedure, the sample consists of 86 European companies. Appendix 1 lists 
the individual firm names and their median CDS premium. The sample is diversified across 
sectors, as it contains energy firms, industrial entities, consumer cyclical and non-cyclical 
firms, insurance companies, banks, telecoms as well as automobile firms. The ratings at the 
end of the sample range from AA to B, therefore covering a sizable fraction of the range of 
credit quality. Overall, we have nearly 67.000 daily observations.  
9 This index contains the 30 most liquid non-financial names from Europe which are rated Baa3 or lower and are on a 
negative outlook. 
3C. Sample description 
Several periods of market turmoil and an overall decline in CDS premia occurred during the 
sample period. Graph 1 plots the median daily premia and Table 1 provides the associated 
descriptive statistics. For instance, in March 2003, the median CDS premium for the firms in 
our sample is around 90 basis points whereas it is only around 25 basis points in October 
2006. Main factors behind this decline in risk premia were a benign macroeconomic 
environment, low equity market volatility and the ‘hunt for yield’, a phenomenon which 
describes institutional investors’ strong demand for higher yielding assets in the aftermath of 
the collapse of stock prices, which had started in March 2000. The search for higher yielding 
assets manifested itself in many asset classes. In the credit markets, this demand pressure 
together with low default rates and the steadily declining equity market volatility contributed to 
a sharp decline in credit spreads.  
An upward jump in CDS premia occurred in May 2005 after S & P downgraded Ford and 
General Motors to the high-yield segment of the credit market. The market turbulence 
following this announcement drove CDS premia up for a limited period of time. This market 
turmoil had an adverse impact on the functioning of the credit derivatives market, reportedly 
causing large losses among some hedge funds.
10
The CDS premia of individual companies display a sizable crossectional dispersion. The table 
in annex 1 shows that financial firms are the group with the lowest median CDS premium with 
a level of 10 to 20 BP. The highest premia are recorded for Alcatel, Koninklijke Ahold, 
HeidelbergCement, Fiat and Rhodia. For these five firms, the median premium exceeds 100 
BP.
In order to illustrate firm-specific characteristics in more detail we show the CDS premia and 
stock prices of Deutsche Bank (AA-rated) and Fiat (BB-rated) in Graph 2. Here the left axis 
refers to the CDS premium and the right axis refers to the stock price (in inverted scale). Thus 
in both variables, an upward movement can be interpreted as a sign of financial distress. 
Over the sample period, the median CDS premium for Deutsche Bank is around 15 BP 
whereas for Fiat it is around 380 BP. For both firms the CDS premium takes its maximum in 
the first half of 2003. Here, the premium for Deutsche Bank peaked at a value of 24 BP, 
whereas the premium for Fiat climbed above 1000 BP. At the end of our sample, in October 
2006, premia for Deutsche Bank are around 11 basis points and those for Fiat at around 150 
basis points, demonstrating the remarkable decline in credit spreads.  
The two firms’ stock prices do not share clear common trends, but the graphs indicate some 
evidence of a comovement between CDS premia and stock prices. For Deutsche Bank and 
Fiat, there are several episodes where the CDS premium has declined and the stock price 
simultaneously saw an upward movement.  
10 ABN AMRO (2005) offers a concise discussion of this episode. 
4D. Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall Calculation 
We analyze the risk of taking the credit risk of a firm by selling a CDS and taking market risk 
by buying shares of the firm with two risk measures routinely used in the banking industry, 
namely Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES). VaR is a certain predefined quantile 
of the profit/loss distribution of a portfolio of financial instruments. Formally VaR can be 
defined as 
) (
1 p F VaRh
   ,           ( 1 )  
where F
-1 is the inverse of the cumulative probability distribution F(¨Vh) of the changes in the 
value ¨Vh of a given portfolio over a fixed time horizon h and p is a pre specified small 
probability such as 0.1 or 0.05. Thus, losses exceeding VaR (so called “tail events”) should 
only occur with probability p over the next h trading days. For the purpose of our risk 
comparisons calculating VaR reduces to calculating the VaR of a position in the CDS and a 
position in the shares of a firm, respectively.  
Although VaR is widely used it has the disadvantage that it is not a coherent risk measure i.e. 
it may not be sub-additive (see Artzner et al. (1999) for details). Moreover, VaR provides no 
information about the expected size of the loss if a tail event occurs. Expected Shortfall, 
defined as the conditional expected loss given that the loss L is at least as large as a certain 
level l
) ( l L L E ES t             ( 2 )  
is coherent and provides information about the size of tail events. We set l = VaRh and 
therefore measure the expected loss over a given horizon from investing in the CDS or the 
shares of a firm if VaR is exceeded. 
To empirically implement (1) and (2) we have to calculate the changes in the value of the 
shares and the CDS over a given time horizon h and then estimate the probability distribution 
F of these changes. The change in the equity value is simply the difference in the stock price 
between time t and time t-h. For the CDS contracts we need to mark - to - market the position 
with a valuation model because the market quote does not represent the value of the position. 
To limit the computational burden we make some simplifying assumptions for our reduced-
form model. In particular, we assume a constant interest rate r (i.e. a flat term structure) over 
the remaining life of the swap, a constant hazard rate Ȝ (i.e. the rate of default at a future time 
given that the firm has not defaulted up to now
11) following a Poison process, a recovery rate 
R (i.e. the percentage of the claim amount of debt which becomes payable on default) that is 
the same for all firms, no counterparty default risk and continuous premium payment until 
either the CDS matures or the underlying bond defaults.  
Under these assumptions the value at time t of a CDS position for a protection seller is given 
by
                                                









p p t V M
] ) ( exp[ 1
) ( 0         ( 3 )  
where p0 is the fair CDS premium at t = 0, pM is the premium observed in the market at time t 
and T is the remaining life of the swap. Calculations in Phillips (2006) suggest that (3) 
provides a fairly accurate approximation to “exact” CDS values despite the simplifying 
assumptions underlying (3). Appendix 2 outlines the derivation of (3). 
12 The change in the 
value of the CDS h days later is then given by ¨Vh = -V(h) since we assume protection selling. 
Thus for a seller of protection (i.e. credit risk taker) the value of the CDS rises if pM < p0 and 
falls if pM > p0.
Intuitively, the valuation of the CDS in equation (3) can be interpreted as follows. The first part 
of the expression equals the difference in CDS premia from 0 to time t and the second part 
represents the risky duration which is driven by – among other factors – the firm’s default 
intensity.
Next we estimate the probability distribution of ¨Vh for both investments. We do this by 
computing the empirical distribution F

 of ¨Vh over the last 200 trading days (i.e. we compute 
F

 from ¨VN, N-h, ¨VN-1, N-1-h,…, ¨V1,1-h). This method is known as “Historical Simulation” in the 
risk management literature.  
The main reason for using Historical Simulation is that the ¨Vh are typically skewed, fat tailed 
or both which makes simpler analytical calculations based on the normal distribution 
unattractive. Thus we avoid strong distributional assumptions but we assume that  ) ( h V F '

obtained from historical observations accurately reflects the probability distribution of future 
changes. Jorion (1997) and Dowd (1998) among others outline alternative methods for 
calculating VaR and Pritsker (2001) provides a critical assessment of the historical simulation 
method.
We then calculate VaR and ES via the empirical distribution F

. The VaR for a specified 
probability p and horizon h is the p-quantile  ) (
1 p F
 
 of the estimated probability distribution 
and ES is the average of the historical losses equal or larger then the estimated VaR. We set 
p equal to 0.1 and 0.05, i.e. we assume a 90% and 95% confidence level, respectively. 
To compare the risk between equities and CDS we require a metric which makes the equity 
and credit market positions refer to the same underlying amount of money. For this purpose 
we express the VaR as a percentage of the notional which we define as EUR 10 million for 
the CDS contract and as the daily adjusted value of the stock position which also starts with 
EUR 10 million. Thus, we assume that the investor enters positions of the same magnitude in 
the credit and the equity market. Since we focus on the market risk incurred by a protection 
seller, the CDS position resembles a transaction where a trader buys EUR 10 million of a 
                                                
12Hull and White (2000), Duffie and Singleton (2003) and Chaplin (2005) provide further details about CDS valuation. 
Fair CDS pricing at t = 0 implies V(0) = 0. 





We first pool all the 86 firms in the sample. Later we discuss the results for specific firms. 
Table 2 shows some summary statistics for the pooled data and graph 3 plots the 
crossectional medians of the equity and CDS VaR over time. All results refer to a twenty day 
horizon and a loss given default of 60%. 
Overall, we observe that the equity VaR exceeds the CDS VaR by a sizable portion. In total, 
i.e. across time as well as across all 86 firms, the 95 % VaR for the equity position equals -
7.5%, whereas the VaR for the CDS position is -0.35%. At the 90% level, the median equity 
VaR equals -5.54% and the CDS VaR is -0.2% of the notional volume. Thus, in the medians 
of the two VaR measures differ by a factor of around twenty. 
Both VaR measures show sizable variation. In particular, the standard deviations of the equity 
risk measures exceed the standard deviations for the CDS positions. Thus, the VaR for the 
equity market not only exceeds the VaR for the CDS segment but it is also more volatile. 
Despite the differences in first and second moments, the VaR estimates display a sizable 
linear comovement. Table 3 shows the bivariate unconditional correlations between CDS and 
equity VaR. For the 95 % and 90% VaR we estimate bivariate correlation coefficients of 0.67 
and 0.53, respectively. These numbers suggest that the comovement is stronger the smaller 
the coverage of the tail area in the distribution of value changes. 
The time series perspective in graph 3 also illustrate this comovement. In both markets, the 
risk measures have an upward trend. Given that the VaR is by definition negative (see 
equation (1)), this upward movement implies that the market risk in both markets has declined 
from 2003 to 2006. The graphs for the CDS VaR also show the impact of the market 
turbulence in May 2005 as this period was characterised by an increase in estimated market 
risk.  
The comovement between the VaR estimates basically reflects the comovement between the  
CDS premium and the stock price. As already Kwan (1986) has shown for corporate bond 
spreads, there is a significant correlation between the credit and the equity market.
14
The difference between the VaR estimates has changed over time. Specifically, graph 3 
indicates that the distance between CDS and equity VaR (in absolute terms) has declined. 
The risk of the equity positions relative to the CDS positions was biggest in the first half of 
2003 and then declined steadily.  
                                                
13 This comparison is only intended for the purpose of illustration because there are a number of differences between 
the hedged corporate bond position and the protection seller’s side in the CDS transaction.  
14 In our sample, the pair-wise correlation between log CDS and log stock prices is -0.16. 
7Let us now turn to the aggregate results for expected shortfall again expressed in percent of 
the notional. As already mentioned ES is a coherent risk measure which provides information 
about the expected size of the loss if a tail event occurs. Due to the rather small number of 
observations in the tail of the empirical distribution of value changes, we only estimate ES at 
the 90% level. We find that the ES for the equity portfolio equals -8 % and – 0.39 % for the 
CDS portfolio. Thus despite using a different risk measure, the orders of magnitude are nearly 
unchanged. 
Before we discuss firm-specific results we briefly summarise the results from a simple back-
testing exercise in table 4. Here we count for each firm the percentage of outliers at the 95 
and 90 % level. For the 95 % VaR we find crossectional median values of 7.6% for the CDS 
and 6.5 % for equities. At the 90 % level, the medians are 8.7 % for the CDS and 10.5% for 
equity respectively. 
B. Firm-specific results 
In the firm specific analysis we look at the results obtained for Fiat and Deutsche Bank in 
more detail. Graph 4 plots the time series of the VaR estimates using the 95 % level.  
Historical Simulation produces a constant VaR if there are no new realisations in the relevant 
tail of the distribution of value changes. This characteristic of the HS approach is apparent 
when comparing the CDS and the equity VaR for Fiat. In the latter case, there are more new 
realisations in the tail of the distribution and therefore, the VaR series is more volatile on a 
day-to-day basis. 
The firm-specific results suggest that the distance between CDS and equity VaR is markedly 
smaller for lower rated firms than for higher rated firms. The median of the 95 % CDS VaR for 
Fiat is -5.5% whereas the equity position has a median VaR of -11%. Thus in the case of the 
lower rated Fiat company the risk for both positions is of the same order of magnitude. In 
contrast, for the higher rated Deutsche Bank, median VaR estimates are -8.8% for the equity 
position and -0.13 for the CDS position. Hence, the riskiness of the CDS position here is an 
order of magnitude smaller. 
As in the aggregate results, a common upward trend is present. For example, the CDS VaR 
for Fiat starts at – 11% and ends up around -1%. Over the same time period the equity VaR 
for Fiat moved from -28 % to -6%. At the end of our sample, in October 2006, the CDS VaR 
for Deutsche Bank is - 0.075 % and the equity VaR equals -6.8%. Thus at the end of the 
sample period the relative orders of magnitude of trading credit risk versus the risk of trading 
equity remain roughly the same for both companies although the absolute risk in both markets 
declined. In addition, the CDS VaR of both firms captures the impact of the May 2005 
turbulence.
For a more general comparison of firms with high credit risk to those with low credit risk we 
construct two subsamples of ten firms each, based on the individuals firms’ median CDS 
premia. In particular, we define the set of the ten firms with the lowest and highest credit risk 
by means of their rank in the order of median CDS premia. The low-credit risk firm set 
8contains mostly banks and has a median CDS premium of 12 BP whereas the high-risk set 
has a median CDS premium of 102 BP. Table 5 contains the summary statistics for these two 
subsets. 
Table 5 indicates that the distance between CDS and equity VaR declines with rising credit 
risk. For the 95 % VaR of the ten “low-risk” firms we find crossectional median values of - 0.1 
% for the CDS and - 6.4 % for equities of the top ten firms and values of - 1.6% for the CDS 
and - 10.9 % for equities of the bottom ten firms respectively. These values translate to a ratio 
between the CDS and eth Equity VaR of 60 for the low-risk set and 7 for the high risk set. 
C. Robustness tests 
We carry out two robustness checks. First, we change the holding period from 20 to 60 days. 
Second, we vary the recovery rate from 40% to 60 %. Table 6 contains the summary statistics 
for these two cases.  
Overall, our results are robust to these two modifications in the estimation procedure. 
However, the distance between CDS and equity VaR declines at the 60 day horizon indicating 
that the CDS becomes relatively more risky the longer the assumed holding period. In 
contrast, the impact of LGD variation is minimal. 
D. Discussion of results 
A number of factors help to explain the considerable difference in the market risk between 
equities and CDS premia. First, due to the short holding period an investment grade 
company’s default probability is very low. This can be illustrated by the fact that according to 
Moody’s (2006) the annual Baa-default rate is just 0.18%.
15 Given that this rate refers to a 
one-year horizon, the corresponding two-week number is very small. Hence the protection 
seller for an investment-grade firm faces only a low risk of losing the underlying principal 
amount when the holding period is short. As a consequence, the main risk involved is not the 
default risk but rather the risk arising from the volatility in CDS premia and the corresponding 
mark-to market valuation.  
Another factor is that our sample period is characterised by low realised defaults and by the 
‘search for yield’, i.e. the persistent decline in credit spreads with the exception of early 2003 
and May 2005 (see, graph 1).
16
From a theoretical perspective, our results are consistent with the Merton (1974) model. The 
approach of Merton (1974) is the most commonly used structural model for pricing claims 
whose payoff is determined by default risk. In this model, the capital structure of the firm 
consists of a zero coupon bond and common equity, which pays no dividends. The model 
specifies a continuous stochastic process for the value of the bond-issuing firm’s asset, where 
                                                
15 This example from Moody’s (2007) refers to the average One-Year Letter default rate computed over the period 
from 1970 to 2006. 
16 See chapter VI in BIS (2004) for a discussion of the “search for yield”. 
9default occurs when the firm’s log-normally distributed value falls below the face value of the 
outstanding debt. 
17
Merton (1974) shows that in the absence of market frictions, bankruptcy costs and taxes the 
payoff structure of a default risky zero coupon bond maturing at time T equals the profile of a 
portfolio containing a risk free bond and a written put option on the firm’s value. Equity 
represents a call option on the value of the firm’s assets. The strike price of these options 
equals the face value of debt. Hence, the theoretical values of equity and debt are as follows: 
Value of equity =    2 1 d N De d VN
rT         ( 4 )  
Value of debt = V - E 
With:
V  Asset Value  
N(•) Normal  distribution 
T
T r D V
d
V





T d d V    1 2
E Equity 
D  Nominal amount of corporate debt 
ı  Volatility of Asset Value 
r  Risk-free interest rate 
We use this model to compare how the market values of debt and equity react to a change in 
the asset value. This analysis of the “delta” of the two positions can thus provide information 
on the relative riskiness of the two instruments: 
Delta  of  call  =  N(d1)          (5) 
Delta of short put = 1 – N(d1) 
Hence, for an investment grade firm the equity delta by far exceeds the delta of the credit 
instrument. This result is also shown graphically in graph 5, where we compare a junk firm, 
which is very close to the default boundary and an investment grade firm, where the asset 
value is very far from the default boundary.  
The fact that equity is more risky than debt can also be illustrated by the subordination in the 
capital structure. As the equity pay offs are subordinated to the cash flows promised to bond 
holders, the former claims must be more risky than the latter. 
III. Conclusions 
Using equally weighted Historical Simulation we compared the risk of trading a CDS with the 
risk of holding the respective firm’s equity by estimating the Value at Risk and the Expected 
                                                
17 Numerous extensions and refinements of Merton’s basic formulation have been presented. (cf. Uhrig-Homburg 
(2002)). 
10Shortfall for both trading positions using daily CDS – stock price pairs for 86 firms recorded 
over the period from March 2003 to October 2006. We used a reduced-form model to mark to 
market the CDS position. We find that the equity VaR is usually substantially larger than the 
CDS VaR. Thus, the potential losses in the equity market may on average be bigger than the 
potential losses arising from trading the same firm’s CDS. In other words, in a pure market to 
market perspective the equity position is more risky than the credit position.  
A key factor behind our finding is that we assumed a holding period of 20 days. This 
assumption appears to be acceptable since both markets are liquid during “normal” times. 
However, over this rather short horizon an investment grade company’s default probability is 
simply very low and the CDS VaR reflects this low default probabilities. Indeed, robustness 
checks indicate that the difference between CDS and equity VaR shrinks as we increase the 
holding period and hence implicitly the probability of default.  
Our firm specific findings further suggest that the distance between CDS and equity VaR may 
be much smaller for firms with higher credit risk. We also find that CDS and equity VaR is 
significantly positively correlated. 
For future research, a number of issues seem promising. First, we intend to look at alternative 
approaches to the Historical simulation, such as the Monte Carlo approach. Second, the 
valuation of CDS in a Merton-type framework may also offer some interesting insights. 
11Appendix 1: List of individual firms
Firm Median  stock  price  Median CDS premium (BP) 
ABN Amro Bank NV  18.82  11.53 
Accor SA  35.50  64.08 
Aegon NV  11.12  24.93 
EADS Finance BV  22.02  28.55 
Koninklijke Ahold NV  6.39  157.12 
Allied Irish Banks Plc  14.41  11.33 
Akzo Nobel NV  31.51  31.56 
Alcatel SA  10.22  127.24 
Allianz AG  29.77  33.86 
Assicurazioni Generali SpA  95.00  22.26 
AXA SA  23.48  19.63 
BASF AG  17.95  26.80 
Bayer AG  50.69  15.10 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA  22.84  34.26 
Banca Intesa SpA  12.27  11.76 
Banco Comercial Portugues SA  3.39  16.32 
Fortum Oyj  2.01  16.25 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA  9.43  27.58 
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG  35.40  25.04 
BNP Paribas  52.59  10.92 
Banco Santander Central Hispano SA  9.20  12.79 
Groupe Danone  70.15  17.25 
Credit Agricole SA  21.39  10.94 
Carrefour SA  39.99  22.90 
Casino Guichard Perrachon SA  62.73  73.99 
Commerzbank AG  16.01  20.78 
Continental AG  45.45  43.33 
Deutsche Bank AG  65.35  16.32 
DaimlerChrysler AG  35.36  77.49 
Koninklijke DSM NV  22.61  30.00 
Deutsche Telekom AG  14.06  45.55 
Endesa SA  16.41  31.48 
Enel SpA  6.53  22.77 
E.ON AG  64.15  20.82 
Energias de Portugal SA  2.21  27.36 
Banco Espirito Santo SA  10.44  17.28 
Sodexho Alliance SA  24.66  57.06 
Fiat SpA  6.37  387.06 
Finmeccanica SpA  13.64  49.67 
Fortis Bank SA/NV  20.17  20.00 
France Telecom SA  21.07  48.65 
Cie de Saint-Gobain  43.76  35.69 
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG  27.94  31.80 
HeidelbergCement AG  42.14  175.51 
Henkel KGaA  68.09  23.00 
Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank AG  17.87  24.40 
Iberdrola SA  17.50  24.53 
ING Bank NV  21.15  11.41 
Royal KPN NV  6.58  52.22 
Lafarge SA  71.39  46.50 
12Firm Median  stock  price  Median CDS premium (BP) 
Linde AG  45.07  41.28 
Arcelor Finance SCA  15.68  60.03 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG  11.19  61.79 
Suez SA  18.19  32.49 
Compagnie Financiere Michelin  44.69  39.77 
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA  58.10  36.92 
Metro AG  38.42  47.72 
Muenchener Rueckversicherungs AG  92.33  23.41 
Nokia OYJ  14.04  22.68 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organization SA  12.51  47.75 
Peugeot SA  46.32  32.69 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV  21.74  36.38 
Portugal Telecom SGPS SA  8.51  37.04 
PPR 82.28  89.58 
Renault SA  64.98  42.69 
Repsol YPF SA  18.23  38.77 
Rhodia SA  1.64  446.75 
Capitalia SpA  3.02  23.83 
RWE AG  40.64  21.62 
Sanpaolo IMI SpA  10.59  14.80 
Siemens AG  61.35  21.40 
Societe Generale  73.61  11.72 
STMicroelectronics NV  15.17  29.53 
Stora Enso Oyj  10.99  50.17 
ThyssenKrupp AG  15.65  88.65 
Telecom Italia SpA  2.43  58.10 
Telefonica SA  12.73  41.21 
Unilever NV  17.77  21.52 
Union Fenosa SA  19.13  40.54 
UniCredito Italiano SpA  4.27  15.23 
UPM-Kymmene Oyj  15.92  53.29 
Veolia Environnement  24.32  34.46 
Vivendi Universal SA  22.83  63.81 
Valeo SA  32.37  54.25 
Volkswagen AG  38.17  55.82 
Wolters Kluwer NV  14.38  51.86 
13Appendix 2: Derivation of CDS valuation
Following Chaplin (2005) we outline the derivation of the CDS valuation formula (3). A 
standard CDS has two legs. One leg consists of the present value of the CDS premium 
payments (fee leg) that a protection buyer makes to the protection seller. The other leg is the 
present value of the payment on default (contingent leg) that the protection seller makes in 
case of default. At origination of the contract the present value of both legs are equated and 
the CDS has a market value V(0) of zero. After origination the value V(t) of the CDS usually 
differs from zero due to changes in the credit quality of the underlying entity, changes in 
interest rates and the passage of time. Assuming no counterparty default risk, a constant 
hazard rate Ȝ, a constant interest rate r and continuous premium payment the value of the 
contingent leg at time s > t is 
ds s S s D R
T
t
) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ³  O
where S(s) = exp(-Ȝs) is the survival probability, R is the recovery rate, D(s) is the discount 




s S s D p ) ( ) (
where p is the CDS premium per annum. Subtracting the fee leg from the contingent leg and 
assuming fair valuation of the trade (i.e. V(0) = 0) yields 
>@ ³    
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where pM is the fair CDS premium observed in the market at time t.
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16Graph 2a: CDS and stock price series (inverted) for Deutsche Bank 
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20Graph 5: Payoff profiles in Merton model 
21Table 1: Descriptive Statistics CDS and stock returns 
 Stock  returns CDS
Mean 0.0006  46.3497 
Median 0.0000  29.6550 
Maximum 0.2503  853.1250 
Minimum -0.3054  5.1790 
Std. Dev.  0.0138  68.4432 
    
Observations 66994 66994 
Number of firms  86  86 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for VaR across firms and time 
  VaR - 5% Equity  VaR - 10% Equity ES – 10% Equity
Mean -9.6884  -6.9889  -10.1819 
Median -7.5062 -5.5465 -8.0132 
Maximum -1.4137  -0.3649  -1.5341 
Minimum -113.2786  -88.0435  -105.2080 
Std. Dev.  8.5870  5.8009  8.3929 
    
Observations 66994  66994  66994 
    
Cross sections  86  86  86 
  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 10% CDS  ES - 10% CDS
Mean -0.7620 -0.4275  -0.8053 
Median -0.3549  -0.2181 -0.3918 
Maximum -0.0084  0.0000  -0.0259 
Minimum -25.3498  -11.6203 -18.1083 
Std. Dev.  1.7218  0.7359  1.4752 
     
Observations 66994  66994  66994 
     
Cross sections  86  86  86 
22Table 3: Correlations of VaR 
  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 10% CDS  VaR - 5% Equity  VaR - 10% Equity
VaR - 5% CDS 1.00       
VaR – 10% CDS 0.72  1.00     
VaR - 5% Equity 0.67  0.50  1.00   
VaR - 10% Equity 0.49  0.53  0.93  1.00 
Table 4: Back-testing of VaR 
  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 5% Equity VaR - 10% CDS VaR - 10% Equity
Mean 0.0760  0.0648  0.0877  0.1052 
Median 0.0723  0.0646  0.0830  0.1074 
Maximum 0.1363  0.1199  0.1989  0.1831 
Minimum 0.0000  0.0290  0.0092  0.0514 
N 86  86  86  86 
23Table 5a: VaR estimation for the ten firms with the lowest mean CDS premium 
  VaR - 5% Equity  VaR - 10% Equity  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 10% CDS
Mean -7.79 -5.52 -0.22 -0.11 
Median  -6.42 -4.77 -0.11 -0.07 
Maximum  -1.76 -1.02 -0.01 0.00 
Minimum -37.32  -27.31  -2.93  -1.20 
Std.  Dev.  5.06 3.51 0.45 0.16 
Table 5b: VaR estimation for the ten firms with the highest mean CDS premium 
  VaR - 5% Equity  VaR - 10% Equity  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 10% CDS
Mean -16.18 -11.34 -3.12  -1.63 
Median  -10.95  -8.27 -1.61 -1.02 
Maximum  -3.22 -1.34 -0.21 -0.14 
Minimum  -113.28  -88.04 -25.35 -11.62 
Std. Dev.  18.16  11.52  4.12  1.54 
Table 6a: VaR estimation with a horizon of 60 days 
  VaR - 5% Equity  VaR - 10% Equity  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 10% CDS
Mean -14.5956  -11.1693  -1.1333  -0.8081 
Median  -10.0044  -7.5335 -0.4920 -0.3515 
Maximum  4.0777 5.0925 1.1122 1.1346 
Minimum -150.4430  -139.5299  -26.7431  -25.1256 
Std. Dev.  15.7192  13.3748  2.3899  1.8880 
N  66994 66994 66994 66994 
Table 6b: VaR estimation with an LGD of 50 % 
  VaR - 5% CDS  VaR - 10% CDS
Mean -0.7452  -0.4204 
Median -0.3530  -0.2176 
Maximum -0.0084  0.0000 
Minimum -23.6531  -10.5873 
Std. Dev.  1.6233  0.7043 
N 66994  66994 
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